Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Logan City v. Michael Stacey Thatcher : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Cheryl A. Russell; Logan City Prosecutor. Attorney for Apellee.
David R. Daines; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Logan City v. Thatcher, No. 890206 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1760

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

^•-"i^iiiF

UTAH
DOCUMENT

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

50
•A7T3
DCtCSAti"C|Tyf

Plainti ff/Respondent,

Case No.

890206-CA

CASE TYPE: APPEAL

vs.

PRIORITY NUMBER

MICHAEL STACEY THATCHER,

2

De fendant/Appe1lant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT CACHE COUNTY
JUDGE CLINT S. JUDKINS

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
CHERYL A. RUSSELL
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Post Office Box 527
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801)752-3060

DAVID R. DAINES
Attorney for Michael Stacey Thatcher
USU Box 1328
Logan, Utah 84322
Telephone: (801)753-2721

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LOGAN CITY,

]

Plaintiff/Respondent,

1
!1

vs.
MICHAEL STACEY THATCHER,

•

Case No.

890206-CA

CASE TYPE: APPEAL
PRIORITY NUMBER

2

Defendant/Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT CACHE COUNTY
JUDGE CLINT S. JUDKINS

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

CHERYL A. RUSSELL
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Post Office Box 527
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801)752-3060

DAVID R. DAINES
Attorney for Michael Stacey Thatcher
USU Box 1328
Logan, Utah 84322
Telephone: (801)753-2721

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii, iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED

1

RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/NATURE OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENTS
1 - LOGAN CITY AND/OR STATE OF UTAH MAY ESTABLISH A
TWENTY MILE PER HOUR SPEED LIMIT NEAR A SCHOOL
WHEN CHILDREN ARE GOING TO OR LEAVING SCHOOL
DURING OPENING AND CLOSING HOURS

5

2 - A CITATION WITH A WRITTEN PROMISE TO APPEAR
MAY BE ISSUED BY A POLICE OFFICER FOR A
MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE COMMITTED IN HIS PRESENCE
IN LIEU OF PLACING THE PERSON UNDER ARREST AND
TAKING HIM INTO CUSTODY

8

3 - THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED)
§77-7-18 THROUGH 77-7-21 IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE

10

CONCLUSION

13

ADDENDUM
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

14
21

i

TABLE CF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

GREAVES v. STATE, 582 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974)

10, 11, 12

IN RE A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT NUMBER
CS-1, 754 P. 2d 633 (Utah 1988)

10

IN RE A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT NUMBER
CS-1, 754 P.2d 633, 640-41 (Utah 1988)

12

LOGAN CITY v. KAREN THATCHER, Court of Appeals No. 880451

8, 10

MTT.T.RR y. STATE, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969)

11

STATE v. LAFFERTY, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988)

12

STATE v. OWENS, 638 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1981)

11

STATE v. PACKARD, 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952)

11

STATE v. WOOD, 648 P.2d 71, 83-84 (Utah), cert, denied,
459 US 988, 103 S. Ct 341, 74 L.ed 2d 383 (1982)

12

TRADE COMMISSION v. SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., 21 Utah 2d 431,
446 P.2d 958 (1968)

10, 11

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-46

1, 5, 7

Utah Code Annotated §41-6-47

1, 6

Utah Code Annotated §44-6-48

1

Utah Code Annotated §77-7-18

1, 2, 3,
8, 12, 13

Utah Code Annotated §77-7-19

1, 2, 3,
12, 13

Utah Code Annotated §77-7-20

1, 2, 3,
8, 9, 12,
13

Utah Code Annotated §77-7-21

1, 12, 13

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED

Utah Code Annotated §77-35-4

8

Utah Code Annotated §77-35-5

8

Logan City Municipal Code 42-7-1

1, 2,
4, 7

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Tenth Amendment

iii

5

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of
speeding, a violation of Logan City Ordinance 42/7/1, in the First
Circuit Court, Cache County, Utah. The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over this appeal under Section 78-2a-3(2) (d), Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED

1)

Whether or not Logan City and/or the State of Utah may

establish a twenty mile per hour speed limit near a school when children
are going to or leaving school during opening or closing hours.
2)

Whether or not a citation with a written premise to appear may

be issued by a police officer for a misdemeanor offense cotmitted in his
presence in lieu of placing the person under arrest and taking him into
custody.
3)

Whether or not

Utah Cbde Annotated (1953) §77-7-18 through

77-7-21 enabling this act is unconstitutionally vague.

RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES

Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended):
41-6-46
41-6-47
41-6-48

1

77-7-18
77-7-19
77-7-20
Logan City Ordinance
42-7-1
Complete Copies of the foregoing statutes and ordinances are
included in the Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal frcm a jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of
speeding, in the First Circuit Court of Cache County, Utah. The
Appellant is requesting the Court of Appeals to reverse his conviction
based on the following:

(1) Appellant was issued a citation for

speeding and gave his written premise to appear in lieu of being
arrested and taken into custody by the arresting officer; (2) Logan City
and/or State of Utah may not establish a twenty mile per hour speed
limit near a school when children are going to or leaving school during
opening or closing hours; (3) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
§77-7-18 through 77-7-21 referred to as the citation enabling act by
Appellant is unconstitutionally vague.
Respondent contends that Appellant's arguments are without merit
and Appellant's conviction should be affirmed.

The prosecution herein

was under a formal written information thereby rendering Appellant's
arguments regarding citations and Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)

2

§77-7-18 through 77-7-21 constitutionality irrelevant to the case
herein.

Furthermore, Logan City and/or the State of Utah clearly had

authority to establish a twenty mile per hour speed limit near a school
when children are going to or leaving school during opening or closing
hours,
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On December 16, 1988 at 8:40 a.m., the Logan City Crossing Guard
turned on two yellow flashing lights (T. 74 Ln. 12) to designate a
"school zone, speed limit 20 miles per hour" (T. 48 Ln. 3-4) at Fourth
North of Logan City where daily approximately thirty to forty children
cross to go to and fron school (T. 75 Ln. 8-11).
An officer had been assigned to run traffic control in the area
that morning, in the area of the school zone because quite often people
fail to slew down and observe the speed limit (T. 42 Ln. 20-23).
At 9:00 a.m., the officer tested his radar equipment to assure that
it was working properly (T. 49 Ln. 10-25 and T. 50 Ln. 1-7). The
equipment was later rechecked at 9:25 a.m. (T. 52 Ln. 2-3) to again
verify that it was working properly (T. 52 Ln. 15-18).
At 9:13 a.m., the officer observed a vehicle driven by Appellant
(T. 47 Ln. 15) , which based upon his over twenty-two years of police
work as well as training in regard to radar operation and certification,
was visually estimated at traveling 34 miles per hour (T. 51, Ln. 2-18,
T. 53 Ln. 5) . The officer then obtained a radar reading of 33 miles per
hour (T. 53 Ln. 7-8). The Appellant was then pulled over for speeding.
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Appellant in lieu of being formally arrested and taken into custody was
issued a citation on which he signed his written premise to appear.
Exhibit "A" in the Addendum herein. The City later filed a formal
information upon Appellant for speeding in violation of Revised
Ordinances of Logan City 42-7-1 which was proceeded on at the trial (T.
39 Ln. 5-21).

Exhibit "B" in the Addendum herein.

The officer testified that 33 miles per hour was not a reasonable
and prudent speed in this particular area at the particular time because
there were several-quite a few children who use that
street, live south of Fourth North and go to school
at the Adams School which is on 5th North and Fourth
East. They have to cross Fourth North, which is the
main thoroughfare. In fact, it is a State Highway
running East and West in Logan City. It is a four
lane high-road. Traffic volume is very heavy,
particularly at that time of day. The kids are
going, not only to grade school, but to the University, to and from, and work and whatever have
you, and these children are required to cross that
street, and it is very hazardous to allow the
traffic to travel at that speed without endangering
these children. (T. 55 Ln 17-25, T. 56 Ln. 1-3).
The flashing lights were turned off by the crossing guard at 9:25
a.m. (T. 74 Ln. 12). The school's first bell is at 9:10 a.m. and the
las bell is at 9:15 a.m. (T. 80 Ln. 4-6).
The Appellant admitted that he was travelling 33 miles per hour in
a school zone (T. 99 Ln. 1-8).
The jury found the Appellant guilty of speeding as set forth in the
formal information filed by Logan City (T. 40 Ln. 9-11).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

LOGAN CITY AND/OR STATE OF UTAH MAY ESTABLISH A TWENTY MILE PER

HOUR SPEED LIMIT NEAR A SCHOOL WHEN CHILDREN ARE GOING TO OR LEAVING
SCHOOL DURING OPENING AND CLOSING HOURS.
2.

A CITATION WITH A WRITTEN PROMISE TO APPEAR MAY BE ISSUED BY A

POLICE OFFICER FOR A MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE CCMMITTED IN HIS PRESENCE IN
LIEU OF PLACING THE PERSON UNDER ARREST AND TAKING HIM INTO CUSTODY.
3.

THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953 as amended) §77-7-18 THROUGH 77-7-21

IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.

ARGUMENT

1
LOGAN CITY AND/OR STATE OF UTAH MAY ESTABLISH
A TWENTY MILE PER HOUR SPEED LIMIT NEAR A SCHOOL
WHEN CHILDREN ARE GOING TO OR LEAVING SCHOOL
DURING OPENING AND CLOSING HOURS
The Tenth Amendment to the United State Constitution provides that
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §41-6-46 provides:
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the
conditions and having regard to the actual and
potential hazards then existing
(2)...the following speeds are lawful. Any speed in
excess of these limits is prima facie evidence that
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the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it
is unlawful: (a) twenty miles per hour when passing
a school building or its grounds during school
recess or while children are going to or leaving
school during opening or closing hours, except that
local authorities may require a complete stop before
passing a school building or grounds at any of these
periods;.••(emphasis added)
In the present case evidence was presented that thirty to forty
children cross daily within the designated school zone on Fourth North
of Logan City going to and fron school (T. 75 Ln. 8-11).

The first bell

is at 9:15 a.m. (T. 80 Lnw 4-6). In fact, children have shown up as
late as 9:22 a.m. (T. 79 Ln. 2 5 ) . The Appellant was observed speeding
in the school zone at 9:13 a.m. (T. 47 Ln. 1 5 ) .
Further, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §41-6-47 provides:
(1) (a) When the Department of Transportation
determines upon the basis of an engineering and
traffic investigation that any prima facie speed
under this article is not reasonable or safe the
existing conditions at the intersection or other
place or on a state highway, the Department of
Transportation may determine a reasonable and safe
prima facie speed limit
(2) The speed limit is effective when appropriate
signs giving notice are erected at the intersection
or other place or part of the highway, (emphasis
added)
It appears fron the facts of the case herein that the yellow
flashing lights on Fourth North of Logan denoting a "school zone, speed
limit 20 miles per hour", were established by the State of Utah.

Fourth

North is a state highway (T. 83 Ln. 4-8) .
Therefore, even if this is not a school zone as Appellant argues,
the speed limit of 20 miles per hour would be effective under Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended) §41-6-47(2) and under Logan City Ordinance
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42-7-1 (b) (2) providing "speed limits on state highways within the city
limits shall be posted by the State".
Additionally and importantly, evidence was produced that 33 miles
per hour was not reasonable nor prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing as prescribed
by Logan City Ordinance 42-7-1 and Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
§41-6-46.
As the arresting officer testified about traveling 33 miles per
hour during the time of day the Appellant was in the Fourth North school
zone:
There were several-quite a few children that use the
street, live across the street, live south of Fourth
North and they go to school which is on 500 North
and Fourth East. They have to cross Fourth North,
which is the main thoroughfare, in fact, it's a
state highway running east and west in Logan City.
It is a four lane high-road, traffic volume is very
heavy, particularly at that time of day the kids are
going, not only to grade school, but to the
university, to and fran to work and whatever have
you, and these children are required to cross that
street, and it is very hazardous to allow traffic to
travel at that speed without endangering those
children." (T. 55 Ln. 11-25, T. 56 Ln 1-3).
Clearly there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could
find the Appellant guilty of speeding in violation of Logan City
Ordinance 42-7-1.
Finally, it is unclear from the record whether or not this issue
was raised by Appellant in the lower court or is being raised for the
first time on appeal.
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2
A CITATION WITH A WRITTEN PROMISE TO APPEAR
MAY BE ISSUED BY A POLICE OFFICER FOR A
MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE COMMITTED IN HIS
PRESENCE IN LIEU OF PLACING THE PERSON
UNDER ARREST AND TAKING HIM INTO CUSTODY
First, this case was prosecuted under a formal written information
(T. 39 In. 5-21, see Addendum Exhibit "B" also) as required by Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-35-4 and 77-35-5. Therefore, it appears
that the arguments made by Appellant in regard to the citation herein
are irrelevant.
Second, Appellant places a great deal of emphasis on the Court of
Appeals decision in Logan City v. Karen Thatcher, No. 880451. That case
was not decided on the merits but rather
Based upon the failure of Respondent Logan City, a
political subdivision of the State of Utah and the
prosecutor herein, to appear at oral argument or to
file a brief herein, the Defendant's conviction is
hereby reversed and the charge of driving on
improper registration is dismissed.
A copy of the remitter in that case is en the Addendum to this
brief.
Third, in regard to the citation itself, Utah Code Annotated (1953
as airended) §77-7-18 authorizes a peace officer in lieu of taking a
person into custody to issue and deliver a citation requiring the person
subject to arrest on a misdemeanor to appear before the Court.
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-7-20 sets forth what a
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citation must contain.

It must contain

(a) The name of the court before which the person
is to appear;
(b) The name of the person cited;
(c) A brief description of the offense charged;
(d) The date, time and place at which the offense
is alleged to have occurred;
(e) The date the citation was issued;
(f) Name of the peace officer who issued the
citation..,;
(g) The time and date or before and after which the
person is to appear;
(h) The address of the court in which the person is
to appear;
(i) A certification above the signature of the
officer issuing the citation in substantially the
following language: "I certify that a copy of this
citation or information (Summons and Complaint) was
duly served upon the Defendant according to law on
the above date and I knew or believe and so allege
that the above-named Defendant did carmit the
offense herein set forth contrary to law. I further
certify ahat the court which the Defendant has been
directed to appear is the proper court pursuant to
Section 77-7-21"; and
(j) A notice containing substantially the following
language: "READ CAREFULLY
This citation is not an information and will not
be used as an information without your consent. If
an information is filed you will be provided a copy
by the court. You MUST appear in court on or before
the time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO
APPEAR AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT
MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST."
The citation herein contained in the Addendum as Exhibit A clearly
complies with Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-7-20.

In fact,

the citation on the back indicates that, "This citation is not an
information and will not be used as an information without your
consent".

Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)

§77-7-20 (i) refers to "a copy of this citation or information (Summons
or Complaint).
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3
THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED)
§77-7-18 THROUGH 77-7-21 IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAliY VAGUE
As previously noted, this case was prosecuted under a formal
written information (T. 39 Ln. 5-21 & see Addendum Exhibit "B" also) as
required by Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-35-4 and 77-35-5.
Therefore, it appears that the arguments made by Appellant in regard to
the citation herein are irrelevant.
Also as previously noted, Appellant places a great deal of emphasis
on the Court of Appeals decision in Logan City v. Karen Thatcher, No.
880451.

That case was not decided on the merits but rather based upon

the Respondent Logan City's failure to file a brief or appear at oral
arguments.
In construing the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, a
court should construe law so as to carry out the legislative intent
while avoiding constitutional conflicts.

In Re A Criminal Investigation

Seventh District Court Number CS-1, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988) An
ordinance or statute will not be declared unconstitutional on account of
vagueness if under any sensible interpretation of its language it can be
given practical effect. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974).
In ascertaining the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance, the following rules of construction should be applied:
1)

A Legislative enactment is presumed to be

valid and in conformity with the constitution.
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Trade

Camiission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. 21 Utah 2d 431, 446
P.2d 958 (1968); Greaves v. State, supra.
2)

The statute or ordinance should not be

invalid unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision
Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969).
3)

The burden of showing invalidity of an ordinance or

statute is upon the one who makes the challenge Trade Commission v.
Skaggs Drug Centers, supra.
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561,
563 (1952), it was recognized
that statutes should not be declared unconstitutional if
there is any reasonable basis upon which they may be
sustained as falling within the constitutional framework, and that a statute will not be held void for
uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect
may be given.
In determining whether or not a statute or ordinance is vague, it
must be sufficiently definite
(1)

lb inform persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be

law abiding, what their conduct must be to conform to its requirements,
(2)

lb advise a defendant accused of violating it just what

constitutes the offense with which he or she is charged, and
(3)

To be susceptible of uniform interpretation and appli-

cation by those charged with responsibility of apply and enforcing it.
State v. Packard, supra, Greaves v. State, supra, State v. Owens, 638
P.2d 1182 (Utah, 1981).
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In fact, it is the established policy of the Utah Supreme Court to
construe statutory provisions whenever possible in a way to avoid
invalidating them on constitutional grounds. Greaves v. State, supra.
For example, in State v. Laffertyf 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988),
the Utah Supreme Court imposed the requirement that juries be instructed
to find that previous crimes of the defendant which have not resulted in
convictions, introduced at a penalty phase, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-84 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 US
988, 103 S. Ct 341, 74 L. Ed 2d 383 (1982), the Utah Supreire Court
construed Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §76-3-207 to require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the penalty phase of a capital case
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, even though no specific burden of persuasion was provided in
the statute.
In Re Criminal Investigation, 7th District Court No. Cs-1,
754 P. 2d

633, 640-41 (Utah 1988) , the Utah Supreme Court went to great

lengths to save the constitutionality of the Subpoena Powers Act by
reading into it a host of new provisions which simply were next put in
by the Legislature.
The statutes herein, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-7-18
through 77-7-21, state with sufficient clarity and conciseness: the
right to issue citations on misdemeanors or infractions; the appearance
required by citation; arrest for failure to appear; collection of bail
amounts; disposition of fines and costs; service of the citation on
defendant; filing in court; contents of citation; proceeding of the
citation-foluntary forfeiture of bail; when an infomation is required
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and so on.
Ito use the logic set forth in Appellant's brief about the above
statutes being vague because of difficulty in understanding the same as
a violation of due process would invalidate argueably much of the
Internal Revenue Code among others.

CONCLUSION

The Appellant's conviction of speeding should be affirmed.
Appellant was properly issued a citation and signed his written premise
to appeal rather than to be arrested and taken into custody by the
arresting officer.

In fact, a formal written information was filed by

the prosecution and it was upon this information that Appellant was
convicted.

Furthermore, Logan City and/or State of Utah may establish a

twenty mile per hour speed limit near a school when children are going
to or leaving school during opening or closing hours. Finally, Utah
Citation Enabling Act, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-7-18
through 77-7-21, is constitutional.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30

day of August, 1989.

Cheryl #. Russell
Logan City Prosecutor
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ADDENDUM "A"

CITATION OR INFORMATION
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT. STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE
IN THE MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY. CACHE COUNTY UTAH 84321
STATE O f UTAH

)

No.C-

S^SSSr t **
The undersigned

/£

1875

INFORMATION - AFFIDAVIT

being duly sworn upon his ooth deposes ond says

„„..,, /Or*

f\^m

v&r «jf '2,fX**

OP« S i

Nome.
'

I o»i

(Please j H i n t ) f u « f ^

Mtddl*

v-s.

Street J L

^4P
z./

A9«.

1/<T7

.Birth D o t e .

Sax ^ H W f i T e - ^ Q

Female
QChoul

Ofiv Lie N O
Veh

^ ^

I K

Moke.

T~a,fa/? -

2. / - ^

. ityle.

.Color

? - ^ >51

Upon o public highway nomely ot (location).

fl-K-U^.

Q*rj^

did unlowtully operate the obove daec/ibed vehicle in the city, county ond state a tore so id <
then ond there commit the following offense
mph

2L±

Impcafwr K f l T U * N a

~/X*' </"£L

T&

in

Nottgnol

wrong lone
Imp/ope* RIGHT TURN

53 Cr

o

Q

Disobeyed TRAFFIC
C O N T t O t SIGNAL

•

Q

Q No signal

Into wrong

Q From wrong

D

Floshingrad

D

Improper backing

Q

Steady tmd

D

Too lost (or existing conditions

Disobeyed STOP SIGN

Q Wrong ploce

Q W o l k speed

O

foster

Improper PASSING

Q

8

O

Wrong lone

Q

O n right

FAILURE TO YIELD

Q

At Intersection
A

D » ••*

X walk

Other violations

Pad

Q Veh

Cut in
Across
phystcol bor

F O t l O W I N G TOO CLOSE LY

Q

(describe)

in violotion ol the (Stote Statute) (City Ordinonce) in such cose mode ond provided
SLIPPERY
PAVEMENT
I o
o ~
e o

CAUSED PERSON
TO DODGE

O Rom
D Snow
k.
Night

8

Q

8

a fo£

!i
IS

OTHER TRAFFIC
PRESENT

Pedestrian
Driver
JUST MISSED
ACCIDENT

a
Snow
D Cross
nL^Ohcoming
U Pede>Jr»an
QU-»6me Oirect

AREA
D Business
H I G H W A Y TYPE
D

Q Industriol
2 lone
Q 3 lone

I PO Q PI D Fotol
I Pod
Qveh
Hit fined obiect
I Right Angle

Heod on
Sideswipe
Ron oil Rood
Intersection
end
Residential
O 4 lone divided

I certify that a copy ot this Citation or Information was duty served upon the defendant
according to law on the above date and I know or believe and so allege that the above named
defendant did commit the offense herein set forth contrary to law I further certify that the
court to which the defendant has been directed to appey is the proper court pursuant to
SectJon77 7 21(SK 77 7 19)
Sworn and subscribed to before me
. day of .

198
. Circuit Judge

COURT APPEARANCE.

i

^^€^J^Ur^~C*

oo

Signature and identification of
officer or other complainant)

-NI

y

? 7 da»of jZz£.i98_£T»t J^—JLwr-ET^

on

ADORESS OF COURT & CLERK OFFICE. 140 NORTH 1ST WEST LOGAN, UTAH
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT, I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS OIRECTEO HEREIN

d

COURT COPY

Signature

^Tfitt^faZr/z./,

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
LOGAN CITY,

)

Plaintiff

INFORMATION

vs.

)

THATCHER, Michael Stacey
1800 South 2800 West
Logan, Utah
Defendant

^ p i f\l 7t <r Q CI
Q Q •? 0/ -' J 7 I
)

The undersigned, RICHARD HENDRICKS under oath, states on the
information and belief that the above named Defendant committed the
crime (s) of:
SPEEDING (SCHOOL ZONE) (CLASS C MISDEMEANOR)
at Logan, Utah on 12/16/88 in violation of the following sections of the
Revised Ordinances of Logan City:
42/7/1
That, contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts
constituting the offense were:
That the Defendant did drive at a speed greater than was reasonable and
prudent under the conditions and having regards to the actual and
potential hazards then existing namely 33 mph in a 20 mph zone (SCHOOL
ZONE),
Class C Misdemeanor
This information is based on evidence obtained fran the following
witnesses:
B. FILLMORE, LCPD
Authorized for presentment & filing

^,
Logan City Prosecutor/Attorney
DAMAGES:
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Subscribed & svrornto before me
this -7 J^ay of p j ^
19%^r,
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Mar. 23, 1989

REMITTITUR
Dgan City,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Court of Appeals No. 880451-CA

v.
aren Thatcher,

First Circuit Court
Logan Dept. No. 825461

Defendant and Appellant.

Based upon the failure of respondent Logan City, a
political subdivision of the State of Utah and the
prosecutor herein, to appear at oral argument or to
file a brief herein, the defendant's conviction is
hereby reversed and the charge of driving on improper
registration is dismissed.

ssued:

Feb. 17, 1989

ecord:

1 VOL and 6 ENVS

MOTOR VEHICLES
•erators. Towing, impound, or storage fees are a
»n on the vehicle.
(8) The registered owner of the vehicle upon
te payment of all fees and charges incurred in
le seizure and impoundment of the owner's veicle has a cause of action for all the fees and
larges, together with damages, court costs, and
itorney fees, against the operator of the vehicle
hose actions caused the impoundment.
(9) No liability may be imposed upon any
eace officer, the state, or any of its political subivisions on account of the enforcement of this
2Ction.

1987

15. R e c k l e s s driving — Penalty.
A person who operates any vehicle in willful or
)n disregard for the safety of persons or property
ilty of reckless driving.
A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty
lass B misdemeanor. Upon a first conviction, the
ity is a minimum term of imprisonment of not
• than five days, or a minimum fine of not less
$25. On a second or subsequent conviction, the
Ity is a minimum term of imprisonment of not
* than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less
$50.

1987

ARTICLE 6
S P E E D RESTRICTIONS
46.

Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate s p e e d s at certain locations —
Prima facie speed limits — E m e r g e n c y
p o w e r of the governor.
I A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed
ter than is reasonable and prudent under the
itions and having regard to the actual and potenhazards then existing, including, but not limited
'hen:
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection
or railroad grade crossing;
(b) approaching and going around a curve;
(c) approaching a hill crest;
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding
roadway; and
fe) special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or
highway conditions.
!) Where no special hazard exists, and subject to
section (3) and Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the
)wing speeds are lawful. Any speed in excess of
se limits is prima facie evidence that the speed is
reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful:
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a
school building or its grounds during school recess or while children are going to or leaving
school during opening or closing hours, except
t h a t local authorities may require a complete
stop before passing a school building or grounds
at any of these periods;
(h) twenty-five miles per hour in any urban
district; and
(c) fifty-five miles per hour in other locations.
3) The Governor by proclamation in time of war or
ergency may change the speed limits on the highys of the state.
1987
•6-47. P r i m a facie s p e e d limit.
1) (a) When the Department of Transportation determines upon the basis of an engineering and
traffic investigation that any prima facie speed
under this article is not reasonable or safe under

41-6-50

the existing conditions at any intersection or
other place or on a state highway, the Department of Transportation may determine a reasonable and safe prima facie speed limit.
(b) When changing a speed limit, the Department of Transportation shall consult with local
political units prior to erecting or changing any
signs within local political boundaries.
(2) The speed limit is effective when appropriate
signs giving notice are erected at the intersection or
other place or part of the highway.
1988
41-6-48.

S p e e d restrictions — P o w e r s of local
authorities — Posted speed.
(1) When local authorities in their respective jurisdictions determine on the basis of an engineering and
traffic investigation that the prima facie speed permitted under this article is not reasonable and safe
under the conditions found to exist upon a highway or
part of a highway, the local authority may determine
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit which:
(a) decreases the limit at intersections;
(b) increases the limit within an urban district; or
(c) decreases the limit outside an urban district, but not to less than 35 miles per hour.
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall determine by an engineering and traffic
investigation the prima facie speed for all highways
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which may be
different than the prima facie speed permitted under
this chapter for an urban district.
(3) Any limit altered under this section is effective
when appropriate signs giving notice are erected
upon the highway.
(4) The Department of Transportation determines
prima facie evidence of a lawful speed on state highways whether the highways are within or without the
corporate limits of any city.
1987
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations.
( 1 ) A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a
speed so slow as to impede or block the normal and
reasonable movement of traffic except when:
(a) reduced speed is necessary for safe operation;
(b) upon a grade; or
(c) in compliance with official traffic control
devices.
(2) Operating a motor vehicle on a controlled access highway at less than the lawful maximum speed
side by side with and at the same speed as a vehicle
operated in the adjacent right lane constitutes evidence of impeding or blocking normal movement of
traffic.
(3) When the Department of Transportation or local authorities within their respective jurisdictions
determine on the basis of an engineering and traffic
investigation that slow speeds on any part of a highway consistently impede the normal and reasonable
movement of traffic, the Department of Transportation or local authority may determine and shall post a
minimum speed limit below which no person may operate a vehicle except when necessary for safe operation.
1987
41-6-50.

Special s p e e d limit on bridges — Prima
facie evidence.
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle over any
bridge or other elevated structure which is a part of a
highway at a speed which is greater than the maximum speed which may be maintained with safety on

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Citation on misdemeanor or infraction
charge.
ice officer, in lieu of taking a person into cusr any public official of any county or municirharged with the enforcement of the law, may
nd deliver a citation requiring any person subarrest or prosecution on a misdemeanor or inn charge to appear at the court of the magisefore whom the person should be taken pursulaw if the person had been arrested.
1980
9. Appearance required by citation — Arrest for failure to appear — Collection
of bail amounts by Office of Recovery
Services — Motor vehicle violations —
Disposition of fines and costs.
Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall
r before the magistrate designated in the citan or before the time and date specified in the
m.
No citation shall require a person to appear
r than five days or later than 14 days following
3uance.
Any person who receives a citation and who
A3 appear on or before the time and date and at
mrt specified shall be subject to arrest. The mage may issue a warrant of arrest and may order
)ffice of Recovery Services, within the Departof Social Services, to enforce collection of any
amounts ordered by the court. The Office of Rey Services may only permanently withhold its
of collection from any bail amount collected
h is subsequently forfeited. If the collected bail
mt is forfeited, the appropriate percentage or
mt of that forfeited bail shall be distributed to
ippropnate governmental entity as provided by
It is the intent of the Legislature that appropria; to the Department of Public Safety reflect a perage of the forfeited bail amounts collected by the
:e of Recovery Services pursuant to this subsecand Section 62A-11-109, so that the costs of law
rcement may be adequately recognized.
) Except where otherwise provided by law, citas or informations, issued for violations of Title 41,
h Code Annotated 1953, shall state that the perreceiving the citation or information shall appear
re the magistrate nearest and most accessible to
place of violation who has jurisdiction over the
nse charged. If the citation or information is isi for a violation within the geographical bound's of any municipality or county precinct in which
istice court exists and in which a justice of the
ce is currently serving, such court shall be deemed
nearest most accessible magistrate before whom
h person shall appear; provided, however, that
sistent with Section 78-4-5, informations or citaIS issued for driving under the influence of alcohol
Irugs, driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or
her, and reckless driving may be filed and tried in
circuit court in the county where the offense ocTed without regard to the location of the offense
hin the county.
5) Any justice of the peace may, upon his own mon or upon the motion of either defense attorney or
>secuting attorney, transfer cases to the nearest
.tice of the peace court or the nearest circuit court
thin said county, except those cases filed under mu:ipal ordinances.
(6) It shall be the duty of clerks and other adminisitive personnel serving the circuit, juvenile, and
stice courts to ensure that all citations for violation
Title 41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are filed prop-
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erly in accordance with the foregoing subsection and
to refuse to receive citations that should be filed in
another court. Fines, fees, costs and forfeitures imposed or collected for violations of Title 41, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, which are not filed contrary to the
foregoing subsections shall be paid over to the municipality or county entitled to the same by the state,
county, or municipal treasurer who has received such
fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures from the court which
collected them. Such accounting and remitting of any
sums due hereunder shall be accomplished at the
close of the fiscal year of the municipality or county
which has received fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures as
a result of any improperly filed citations.
1988
77-7-20. Service of citation on defendant — Filing in court —- Contents of citations.
(1) If a citation is issued p u r s u a n t to Section
77-7-18, t h e peace officer or public official shall issue
one copy to the person cited and shall within five days
file a duplicate copy with t h e court specified in the
citation.
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under authority
of this chapter shall contain:
(a) The n a m e of the court before which the person is to appear;
(b) T h e name of t h e person cited;
(c) A brief description of t h e offense charged;
(d) T h e date, time and place at which t h e offense is alleged to have occurred;
(e) T h e date on which t h e citation was issued;
(f) T h e n a m e of the peace officer or public official who issued the citation, and the name of the
arresting person if an arrest was made by a private party and the citation was issued in lieu of
taking t h e arrested person before a magistrate;
(g) T h e time and date on or before and after
which t h e person is to appear;
(h) T h e address of the court in which the person is to appear;
(i) A certification above the signature of the
officer issuing the citation in substantially t h e
following language: "I certify t h a t a copy of this
citation or information (Summons and Complaint) was duly served upon the defendant ac~
cording to law on the above date and I know or
believe and so allege that the above-named defendant did commit the ofiense herein set forth
contrary to law. I further certify that the court to
which t h e defendant has been directed to appear
is t h e proper court pursuant to Section 77-7-21.";
and
(j) A notice containing substantially the following language:
READ CAREFULLY
This citation is not an information and will not be
used as an information without your consent If an
information is filed you will be provided a copy by t h e
court. You MUST appear in court on or before the
time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR
AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND T H E
COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST.
1980
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation — Voluntary
forfeiture of bail — Information, when
required.
(1) Whenever a citation is issued pursuant to the
provisions of Section 77-7-18, the copy of the citation
filed with the magistrate may be u^ed in lieu of an
information to which the person cited may plead
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guilty or no contest and be sentenced or on which bail
may be forfeited. With the magistrate's approval a
person may voluntarily forfeit bail without appearance being required in any case of a class B misdemeanor or less. Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall
be entered as a conviction and treated the same as if
the accused pleaded guilty.
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear before a magistrate pursuant to a citation issued under
Section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the offense
charged, or does not deposit bail on or before the date
set for his appearance, an information shall be filed
and proceedings held in accordance with the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and all other applicable provisions of this code, which information shall be deemed
an original pleading; provided, however, t h a t the person cited may by written agreement waive the filing
of the information and thereafter the prosecution
may proceed on the citation notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary.
i»80

174

suspect unable to employ counsel shall be entitled to
representation by an attorney appointed by a magistrate for a lineup either before or after an arrest
77-8-3. Conduct of peace officer.
The peace officers conducting a lineup shall not attempt to influence the identification of any particular
suspect.
im
77-8-4.

Record of proceedings — Access by suspect
The entire lineup procedure shall be recorded, including all conversations between the witnesses and
the conducting peace officers. The suspect shall have
access to and may make copies of the record and anj
photographs taken of him or any other persons in
connection with the lineup.
\m
CHAPTER 9
UNIFORM ACT ON FRESH PURSUIT

77-7-22. Failure to appear a s m i s d e m e a n o r .
Any person who willfully fails to appear before a
court pursuant to a citation issued under the provisions of Section 77-7-18 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, regardless of the disposition of the charge
upon which he was originally cited.
1980

Section
77-9-1.
77-9-2.
77-9-3.

77-7-23.

77-9-1.

Section
77-8-1.

77-9-2. Procedure after arrest.
An officer who has made an arrest pursuant to Section 77-9-1 shall without unnecessary delay take the
person arrested before a magistrate of the county in
which the arrest was made. The magistrate shall conduct a hearing to determine the lawfulness of the
arrest. If he finds the arrest was lawful, the magistrate may commit the person arrested for a reasonable time or may admit the person to bail pending
extradition proceedings.
i«w?

Delivery of prisoner arrested without
warrant — Information — Violation as
misdemeanor.
When an arrest is made without a w a r r a n t by a
peace officer or private person, the person arrested
shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken to the
magistrate in the precinct of the county or municipality in which the offense occurred, and in information,
stating the charge against the person shall be made
before such magistrate. In the event the magistrate of
the precinct is not available, the arrested person shall
be taken before the available magistrate nearest to
the scene of the alleged offense. Any officer or person
violating any of the provisions of this section shall be
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1980
CHAPTER 8
LINEUPS

77-8-2.
77-8-3.
77-8-4.

Order of magistrate — Grounds — Arrested suspect's appearance without order.
Suspect's right to have attorney present.
Conduct of peace officer.
Record of proceedings — Access by suspect.

77-8-1.

O r d e r of m a g i s t r a t e — G r o u n d s — Arrested s u s p e c t s a p p e a r a n c e without
order.
( D A magistrate may issue an order requiring a
suspect to appear in a lineup when probable cause
exists to believe a crime has been committed and
there is reason to believe the suspect committed it.
(2) A suspect who has been arrested, and is in custody, may be required by a peace officer to appear in a
lineup without a court order.
(3) Upon application of any suspect and a showing
of good cause, a magistrate may order a lineup.
1980
77-8-2. S u s p e c t ' s r i g h t to h a v e a t t o r n e y p r e s e n t .
A suspect has the right to have his attorney present
at any lineup. The magistrate or party in charge of
the lineup shall notify the suspect of this right. Every

Authority of peace officer of another state.
Procedure after arrest.
Authority of peace officer of this state beyond normal jurisdiction.

Authority of peace officer of another
state.
A peace officer of another state or the District of
Columbia who enters this state in fresh pursuit and
continues in fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he is reasonably believed
to have committed a felony in another state, has the
same authority to arrest and hold a person in custody
as a peace officer of this state. Fresh pursuit does not
require instant action, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
i$w>

77-9-3.

Authority of p e a c e officer of this state
beyond n o r m a l j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any governmental entity of this state may exercise a peace
officer's authority beyond the limits of such officer'*
normal jurisdiction as follows:
(a) When in frosh pursuit of an offender for the
purpose of arresting and holding that person in
custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdiction where the offense was committed;
(b) When a public offense is committed in such
officer's presence;
(c) When participating in an investigation of
criminal activity which originated in such officer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the
local authority;
(d) When called to assist peace officers of another jurisdiction.
(2) Any peace officer, prior to taking such authorized action, shall notify and receive approval of the
local law enforcement authority, or if such prior contact is not reasonably possible, notify the local law

Chapter 7.
SPEED REGULATIONS
42-7-1. Speed Regulations—Maximum Speeds—School
Intersections, Crossing, and Curves.

Buildings-

(a) No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the
actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event speed shall
be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid col 1iding with any person,
vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with
legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.
(b) The following speeds shall be lawful unless otherwise posted.
Speeds in excess of the following limits or in excess of the posted limits
shall be prima facie evidence that the speeds are not reasonable and prudent
and that they are unlawful:
1.

Twenty miles per hours when passing a school building or
grounds thereof during school recess or while children
are going to or leaving school during opening and
closing hours.

2.

Twenty-five miles per hour in any business, residential
or urban district inside the city limits of Logan City,
unless otherwise posted.

3.

Speeds other than those listed in subparagraphs 1 and
and 2 above may be allowed within the corporate limits
of Logan City whenever it is determined upon the basis
of an engineering and traffic investigation that the speed
permitted by law is more or less than is necessary for the
safe operation of the vehicles thereon. Any such change
in speeds shall be posted by properly erected signs giving
notice thereof.

4.

Speed limits on state highways within the city limits shall
be as posted by the state.

42-7-2. Driving Too Slow. No person shall drive a motor
vehicle at such slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable
movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation
in compliance with law.
42-7-3. Speed or Acceleration Contests. No person shall engage
in any motor vehicle speed contest or in any motor vehicle acceleration
contest on any street or alley, and no person shall aid or abet any such
vehicle speed contest or acceleration contest on any street or alley.
42-7-4. Obstruction for Exhibition Forbidden. No person shall
for the purpose of facilitating, aiding or as an incident to any vehicle
speed contest or vehicle acceleration contest in any manner obstruct or
place any barricade or obstruction or assist or participate in placing any
such barricade or obstruction upon any street or alley.
(CHAPTER 7 AMENDED 9/23/82)
"^Corrected

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the % D day of August, 1989, -f- nailed
four (4) copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to David R. Daines,
Attorney for Appellant, USU Box 1328, Logan, Utah 84322.

Cheryl A/ Russell
Logan City Prosecutor

